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Oblivious transfer with access control (OTAC) is an extension of oblivious transfer where 
each message is associated with an access control policy. A receiver can obtain a message 
only if her attributes satisfy the access control policy for that message. In most schemes, 
the receiver’s attributes are certiﬁed by an issuer. Recently, two Issuer-Free OTAC protocols 
have been proposed. We show that the security deﬁnition for Issuer-Free OTAC fulﬁlled by 
those schemes poses a problem. Namely, the sender is not able to attest whether a receiver 
possesses a claimed attribute. Because of this problem, in both Issuer-Free OTAC protocols, 
any malicious receiver can obtain any message from the sender, regardless of the access 
control policy associated with the message. To address this problem, we propose a new 
security deﬁnition for Issuer-Free OTAC. Our deﬁnition requires the receiver to prove in 
zero-knowledge to the sender that her attributes fulﬁll some predicates. Our deﬁnition is 
suitable for settings with multiple issuers because it allows the design of OTAC protocols 
where the receiver, when accessing a record, can hide the identity of the issuer that 
certiﬁed her attributes.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Oblivious transfer (OT) [1] is a two-party protocol be-
tween a sender and a receiver. The sender receives as input 
N messages (m1, . . . , mN), while the receiver gets K selec-
tion values (σ1, . . . , σK). As output, the receiver gets the 
messages (mσ1 , . . . , mσK ). Sender security requires that the 
receiver gets no information on the other messages, while 
receiver privacy requires that the sender does not learn 
any information on (σ1, . . . , σK).
Oblivious transfer with access control (OTAC) [2] allows 
the sender to control access to the messages. The sender 
receives as input (m1, P1, . . . , mN, PN), where (P1, . . . , PN)
are access control policies for each of the messages. Each 
receiver possesses a set of attributes A and is able to ob-
tain the message mi only if A satisﬁes Pi .
OTAC schemes involve three types of parties: the 
sender, who possesses a database (m1, P1, . . . , mN, PN); the 
E-mail address: alfredo.rial@uni.lu.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2017.05.006
0020-0190/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.issuer, who certiﬁes the receivers’ attributes A and issues 
credentials to receivers; the receivers, who ﬁrst get their 
attributes certiﬁed by the issuer and subsequently employ 
the issued credentials to access the sender’s database.
Receiver privacy requires that the sender does not learn 
any information on the messages the receiver obtains or on 
the receiver’s attributes. Sender privacy requires that the 
receiver does not learn any information on messages that 
were not requested or on messages whose access control 
policy is not fulﬁlled by the receiver’s attributes. Addi-
tionally, in some schemes, the access control policies are 
hidden from the receivers [3], while in other schemes they 
are public [2,4]. We describe in detail the security deﬁni-
tion for OTAC with public policies in Section 2.
Recently, Guleria and Dutta propose Issuer-Free OTAC 
with public policies [5,6]. In Issuer-Free OTAC, the role of 
the issuer is performed by the sender. In this paper, we 
show that the security deﬁnition for issuer-free OTAC in [5,
6] poses a problem. In a nutshell, the security deﬁnition 
for OTAC with public policies proposed by Camenisch et 
al. [2] allows the issuer to learn the receiver’s identity and 
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ceiver indeed possesses those attributes. In contrast, in the 
security deﬁnition in [5,6], to protect receiver privacy, the 
sender learns neither the receiver’s identity nor the re-
ceiver’s attributes, and thus is not able to attest whether 
the receiver possesses the claimed attributes.
This has serious implications on the security of the pro-
tocols proposed in [5,6]. In those protocols, the sender 
always proceeds as if the receiver did possess those at-
tributes without performing any check. This allows any 
malicious receiver to be issued any attribute, which allows 
this receiver to obtain any message from the sender, re-
gardless of the access control policy associated with the 
message. Consequently, the protocols in [5,6] do not en-
force any form of access control.
We propose a new security deﬁnition for Issuer-Free 
OTAC. Our deﬁnition allows the receiver to prove in zero-
knowledge to the sender that her attributes fulﬁll some 
predicates. The concrete predicates will depend on the in-
formation the sender needs in order to attest the receiver’s 
attributes. In the typical setting where attributes need to 
be certiﬁed by an issuer, we show that our new function-
ality is useful to handle multiple issuers.
2. Oblivious transfer with access control
Camenisch et al. [2] propose an ideal functionality 
FOTAC for oblivious transfer with access control (OTAC). 
In this section, we recall that ideal functionality. The in-
teraction between FOTAC, the sender E , the issuer I , and 
the receivers R1, . . . , RM takes place through the inter-
faces initdb, issue and transfer. The sender E possesses a 
list of messages (m1, . . . , mN). These messages are associ-
ated with the access control policies (P1, . . . , PN). An ac-
cess control policy describes the attributes that a receiver 
must possess in order to be allowed to obtain a message. 
The attributes that a receiver possesses are certiﬁed by I . 
FOTAC maintains an initially empty set Am(m ∈ [1, M]) for 
each of the receivers Rm .
Functionality FOTAC
1. On input (initdb, m1, P1, . . . , mN, PN) from E , 
FOTAC stores (m1, P1, . . . , mN, PN).
2. On input (issue, a) from Rm , FOTAC sends 
(issue, Rm, a) to I . I sends back a bit b. If 
b = 1, FOTAC adds the attribute a to Am and 
sends b to Rm , else FOTAC simply sends b to 
Rm .
3. On input (transfer, σ) from Rm , FOTAC proceeds 
as follows. If (m1, P1, . . . , mN, PN) is stored, 
FOTAC sends transfer to E . E sends back a bit b. 
If b = 1 and the attribute set Am fulﬁlls the pol-
icy Pσ , FOTAC sends the message mσ to Rm . If 
b = 0 or if (m1, P1, . . . , mN, PN) is not stored, 
FOTAC sends ⊥ to Rm .
As described in [2], FOTAC guarantees the following se-
curity properties:Receiver Privacy. When a receiver Rm obtains a message 
mσ , the sender E learns neither Rm nor σ , i.e., in 
the transfer phase, the receiver remains anonymous 
and the sender does not learn the message that the 
receiver obtains. The sender only learns that an un-
known receiver gets a message whose access control 
policy is fulﬁlled by the receiver’s attributes.
Sender Security. A corrupt receiver cannot obtain a mes-
sage whose access control policy is not fulﬁlled by the 
receiver’s attributes. Colluding receivers are not able 
to share their attributes, i.e., a group of colluding re-
ceivers is not able to get access to a message whose 
access control policy is not fulﬁlled by the attributes 
of a particular receiver in the group. If a corrupt re-
ceiver colludes with the issuer, then the receiver can 
obtain one record at each transfer phase.
3. Issuer-free oblivious transfer with access control in 
[5, 6]
We recall the ideal functionality FIOTAC for issuer-free 
OTAC proposed by Guleria and Dutta [5,6]. The difference 
between FIOTAC and the functionality FOTAC described in 
Section 2 is in the issuing phase. Therefore, we only recall 
the issue interface of FIOTAC.
Functionality FIOTAC: interface issue
2. On input (issue, a) from Rm , FIOTAC sends issue
to E . E sends back a bit b in response to issue. 
If b = 1, FIOTAC adds the attribute a to Am and 
sends b to Rm , else FIOTAC does nothing.
As can be seen, in FIOTAC, in contrast to FOTAC, the is-
suer is not present and the issuing phase is executed by 
the sender E and by the receiver Rm . Additionally, while 
in FOTAC the issuer receives the identity of the receiver Rm
and the attribute a, in FIOTAC the sender receives neither 
Rm nor a.
The latter difference creates a problem. In a real proto-
col that realizes FOTAC, the issuer can receive the identity 
of the receiver Rm and the attribute a. Based on that infor-
mation, the issuer is able to attest whether Rm possesses 
the attribute a, and, in that case, the issuer issues a cre-
dential on that attribute to Rm . However, in any real pro-
tocol that realizes FIOTAC, the sender cannot receive any 
information on Rm or a whatsoever. (The reason is that, 
in the ideal protocol, the sender does not receive that in-
formation.) In that case, how is the sender supposed to 
decide whether the receiver possesses that attribute? This 
has serious implications on the security of the real world 
protocols that realize FIOTAC proposed in [5,6]. In those 
protocols, the sender does not receive any information on 
the attributes or on the identity of the receiver in the is-
suing phase, and in fact the sender always proceeds as if 
the receiver did possess those attributes without perform-
ing any check. This allows any malicious receiver to be 
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any message from the sender. Consequently, the real world 
protocols in [5,6] do not enforce any form of access con-
trol.
4. New ideal functionality for issuer-free OTAC
A trivial way to solve the problem in the functional-
ity FIOTAC for Issuer-Free OTAC proposed by Guleria and 
Dutta [5,6] would be to modify the issuing phase so that 
FIOTAC sends to the sender the identity Rm of the receiver 
and the attribute a. However, this would weaken the pri-
vacy properties of FIOTAC in comparison to FOTAC, since in 
FOTAC the sender does not learn those values. The issuer 
does learn those values, but it is generally considered that 
receivers are willing to put more trust in a credential is-
suer than in a sender.
Therefore, we propose a new functionality that balances 
receiver privacy and sender security. Our functionality al-
lows the receiver to prove in zero-knowledge some state-
ments about the receiver’s attributes. To this end, we pa-
rameterized the functionality FIOTAC with a relation R. In 
the issuing phase, the receiver sends to the functionality 
FRIOTAC an attribute a, a witness wit and an instance ins. 
FRIOTAC veriﬁes that (〈a, wit〉, ins) ∈ R. (The attribute a is in-
cluded in the witness for the relation R.) If the veriﬁcation 
succeeds, FRIOTAC sends the instance ins to the sender. We 
formally describe the issuing phase of FRIOTAC below.
Functionality FRIOTAC: interface issue
2. On input (issue, a, wit, ins) from Rm , FRIOTAC
aborts if (〈a, wit〉, ins) /∈ R. Else, FRIOTAC sends 
(issue, ins) to E . E sends back a bit b. If b = 1, 
FRIOTAC adds the attribute a to Am and sends b
to Rm , else FRIOTAC simply sends b to Rm .
In any real world protocol that realizes FRIOTAC, in the 
issuing phase, the sender can learn the fact that the re-
ceiver’s attributes fulﬁll the relation R with respect to the 
instance ins. This allows the design of real world protocols 
where the receiver can prove to the sender statements in 
zero-knowledge about her attributes, so that the sender 
can certify that the receiver possesses those attributes 
based on the proven statements. The concrete statements 
that the receiver must prove depend on the information 
the sender needs in order to attest the receiver’s attributes. 
In Section 4.1, we describe the use of FRIOTAC in the typical 
case where attributes need to be certiﬁed by an issuer.
4.1. Applications of the new ideal functionality FRIOTAC
A protocol that realizes FOTAC involves the sender E , 
the issuer I , and the receivers R and consists of three 
phases: initdb, issue, and transfer. In the initdb phase, E en-
crypts the messages and publishes an encrypted database 
where each message is associated with an access control policy. In the issue phase, R sends some attributes to I , 
I certiﬁes that R indeed possesses those attributes, signs 
R’s attributes by using I ’s secret key and sends the sig-
nature to R. In the transfer phase, R chooses the message 
that she wants to obtain and proves in zero-knowledge to 
E that she possesses a signature from I on attributes that 
satisfy the access control policy associated with that mes-
sage. After E veriﬁes this zero-knowledge proof, E helps R
to decrypt the message (without learning the message that 
R decrypts).
The reason why all the existing OTAC schemes (except 
the issuer-free ones by Guleria and Dutta) include an is-
suer is the following. Receivers need to prove that their 
attributes fulﬁll the access control policy associated with 
a message. This requires that some party certiﬁes R’s at-
tributes. In practical applications, that party needs to learn 
R’s attribute values in order to certify them. This step is 
unavoidable because, without learning the attribute values 
(e.g., age, nationality, address, . . . ) claimed by R, verifying 
their truthfulness is not possible. For privacy reasons, re-
ceivers may be unwilling to reveal their attributes to E . To 
solve this problem, OTAC schemes include a third party, 
the issuer, that is only in charge of certifying receiver’s 
attributes and to whom receiver’s accept to disclose their 
attributes. In practice, I would be an authority such as a 
municipality or the police.
The issuer-free OTAC schemes by Guleria and Dutta do 
not work because attribute certiﬁcation does not take place 
and thus receivers can claim any attribute they wish and 
obtain any message. Therefore, since in typical settings is-
suers are necessary, the reason why we propose a new 
functionality FRIOTAC is not to eliminate the need of an is-
suer. Instead, the new functionality allows the creation of 
OTAC protocols for multiple issuers.
Consider a setting where E only trusts one issuer to 
certify R’s attributes. In this case, using the new function-
ality FRIOTAC is cumbersome. The reason is that the relation 
R that parameterizes the functionality would require that 
R proves in zero-knowledge possession of a credential 
from the issuer trusted by E . Therefore, in a protocol that 
realizes FRIOTAC, R would ﬁrst get his attributes certiﬁed by 
I to get a credential from I , then R would prove in zero-
knowledge possession of the credential to E , and ﬁnally 
E would give yet a second credential that signs the same 
attributes to R. Consequently, in settings where E trusts 
only one issuer, the new functionality FRIOTAC should not 
be used. Instead, the existing functionality FOTAC should 
be used.
However, the new functionality FRIOTAC is appealing 
when E trusts more than one issuer. This setting cannot be 
handled by the existing functionality FOTAC. Additionally, 
modifying the functionality and the corresponding proto-
cols to include more than one issuer is not straightforward. 
The problem is the following. Consider a setting with two 
issuers I1 and I2, where some access control policies re-
quire that attributes be certiﬁed by I1 and others by I2. 
In that case, when R proves in zero-knowledge possession 
of her credential, despite the fact that the attribute values 
are not revealed to E , E learns the identity of the issuer of 
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Parse pkI = (g1,h0,h1,h2,u, v,w, gt ,ht , yI )
Parse pkE = (gˆ1, hˆ0, hˆ1, hˆ2, hˆ3, uˆ, vˆ, wˆ, gˆt , hˆt , yE )
Parse stU = (P ′, zU ) and pick random r1, t, t′ ← Zp
Compute P1 ← hˆc1hˆr13 , A¯ ← Acut and B ← vtut
′
Compute PK1 = PK{(zu , c, r1, I, sc , rc , t, t′,α,β):
P ′ = hˆzU0 ∧ P1 = hˆc1hˆr13 ∧ B = vtut
′ ∧
1 = B−sc vαuβ ∧ e( A¯,yI )e(g1,g1) = e( A¯, g1)−sc e(u, yI )t ·
e(u, g1)αe(h2, g1)rc e(h0, g1)zU e(h1, g1)c}
Send (P ′, P1,PK1, A¯, B) → Verify PK1 and parse skE = xE
Parse pkE = (gˆ1, hˆ0, hˆ1, hˆ2, hˆ3, uˆ, vˆ, wˆ, gˆt , hˆt , yE )
Pick random r2, s′c ← Zp
Compute A′c ← (gˆ1 P ′ P1hˆI2hˆr23 )1/(xE+s
′
c )
Set r′c ← r1 + r2 ← Send (A′c , s′c , r2)
Verify e(A′c , gˆ
s′c




Fig. 1. Construction for functionality F RIOTAC: interface issue.the credential. This harms receiver privacy because it re-
veals to E whether the message that R wishes to obtain 
is associated with an access control policy that requires at-
tributes certiﬁed by that issuer.
This problem can be solved by using a protocol that re-
alizes the new functionality FRIOTAC. In our example, the 
relation R requires R to prove in zero-knowledge posses-
sion of credentials from I1 or I2. In the issuing phase of a 
protocol that realizes FRIOTAC, R proves in zero-knowledge 
possession of a credential from I1 or I2 to E , and then E
sends a new credential to R that signs the same attribute 
values plus the identity of I1 or I2. The access control 
policies only accept credentials signed by E and include 
I ’s identity as an attribute. Therefore, because I ’s identity 
is now an attribute, I ’s identity is not revealed to E when 
R proves possession of a credential in order to obtain a 
message.
As a concrete example, we show how to modify the 
OTAC protocol by Camenisch et al [2] so that it can han-
dle multiple issuers. At setup, each of the issuers I run 
the protocol ISetup described in Figure 2 in [2] in order 
to compute a private key skI = xI and a public key pkI =
(g1, h0, h1, h2, u, v, w, gt , ht, yI ) to compute and verify sig-
natures. The sender E also runs the protocol in Figure 2 
in [2] to compute skE and pkE , but pkE consists of an ad-
ditional element hˆ3. The database setup algorithm DBSetup
in Figure 3 in [2] remains unchanged, except that, for each 
record of data Ri , the attribute ci1 in the access control list 
ACLi = (ci1, . . . , cil) is the identity of an issuer. A receiver 
must get her attributes certiﬁed by this issuer in order to 
satisfy ACLi .
The issuing phase is divided into two parts. First, a re-
ceiver runs multiple times with one or more issuers the 
issuing protocol Issue described in Figure 4 in [2]. As a 
result of each execution of the issuing protocol, the re-
ceiver obtains a signature (Ac = (g1Phc1hrc2 )1/(xI+sc), sc, rc)
that signs her secret key zU (P = hzu0 ) and one of her at-
tributes c. Second, the receiver gets her attributes signed 
by the sender. This step corresponds to the realization of 
the issue interface of our functionality FRIOTAC. We describe 
the protocol in Fig. 1. A receiver executes this protocol 
once for each of the signatures issued by the issuers. In a 
single execution, the receiver inputs a signature (Ac, sc, rc)
and the identity I of the issuer, while the sender inputs his signing key pair (skE , pkE). As result, the receiver ob-




1/(xI+s′c), s′c, r′c) signed 
by the sender on her secret zU , on her attribute c, and on 
the issuer identity I .
Finally, a receiver and the sender execute the transfer 
algorithm Transfer described in Figure 5 in [2]. In Figure 5 
in [2], the receiver proves in zero-knowledge to the sender 
that she possesses one signature (Ac, sc, rc) issued by the 
issuer for each of the attributes in ACLi . We require two 
modiﬁcations. First, instead of using signatures (Ac, sc, rc)
signed by issuers, the receiver uses signatures (A′c, s′c, r′c)
signed by the sender. Second, because now ACLi also con-
tains the identity of the issuer, the receiver, in addition to 
proving that the attribute c signed in (A′c, s′c, r′c) equals one 
of the attributes (ci2, . . . , cil) in ACLi , proves also that the 
issuer identity signed in (A′c, s′c, r′c) equals ci1.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that the security deﬁnition for Issuer-
Free OTAC in [5,6] poses a problem. Namely, it does not 
allow the sender to attest whether a receiver possesses the 
claimed attributes. In the protocols proposed in [5,6], any 
malicious receiver can obtain any message from the sender, 
regardless of the access control policy associated with the 
message. Consequently, the protocols in [5,6] do not en-
force any form of access control. To address this problem, 
we have proposed a new security deﬁnition for Issuer-Free 
OTAC. Our deﬁnition requires the receiver to prove in zero-
knowledge to the sender that her attributes fulﬁll some 
predicates. Our deﬁnition is suitable for settings with mul-
tiple issuers because it allows the design of OTAC protocols 
where the receiver, when accessing a record, can hide the 
identity of the issuer that certiﬁed her attributes. In the 
table below, we compare the properties of our approach 
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